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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
After the initial briefing was completed in this case, the Idaho Supreme Court's
opinion in Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365 (2014), became final. The
Court of Appeals requested supplemental briefing on the issue of what affect the
holding in Murphy, "that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is not a
sufficient reason under I.C. § 19-4908 for allowing a successive petition," 156 Idaho at
_ , 327 P.3d at 367, has on the outcome of this case.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Relevant to this supplemental brief, the Court of Appeals previously set forth the
following factual background for this case:
In 2003, Parvin filed a pro se application for post-conviction relief
alleging, in pertinent part, ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to
ensure that his Rule 35 motion was ruled upon in a reasonable period of
time. Parvin requested assistance of counsel, which the district court
granted and appointed the Canyon County Public Defender. A conflict
was discovered and the case was transferred to a conflict public defender.
After the subsequent appointment, the State filed a motion for summary
dismissal. A notice of substitution of counsel was filed as another attorney
took over the case. No other action was taken until a notice of intent to
dismiss was filed pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 40(c). The
district court filed an order of dismissal thereafter.
Parvin later testified that he never received notice from either the
district court or his appointed counsel of the proposed dismissal. Upon
learning of the dismissal, Parvin filed a notice of appeal, which was then
dismissed because it was untimely.
Parvin filed another application for post-conviction relief, re-alleging
the grounds in the original application, and alleging several additional
claims of ineffective assistance of his post-conviction counsel. Once
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again, Parvin argued that his original trial attorney was ineffective for
failing to ensure that the district court ruled on his Rule 35 motion in a
timely manner. He also asserted that he was entitled to a successive
petition "because my claims were not knowingly or voluntarily waived. My
claims were dismissed due to the ineffective assistance of post-conviction
counsel."
Parvin v. State, Docket No. 38295, 2012 Unpublished Op. No. 453 at 3-4 (Idaho App.,
April 30, 2012). The district court agreed, determining that "Parvin was justified in filing
the second post conviction action" because "he received ineffective assistance of
counsel in his first post conviction action because the action was dismissed for
counsel's failure to take any action on [Parvin's) behalf." (38295 R., p.156.)
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ISSUE
Parvin states the issue on appeal as:
Does the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Murphy preclude Mr.
Parvin from obtaining relief on appeal?

(Appellant's supp. brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Does the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Murphy, "that ineffective assistance
of post-conviction counsel is not a sufficient reason under I.C. § 19-4908 for allowing a
successive petition," provide an additional basis for affirming the district court's order
denying Parvin's successive petition for post-conviction relief?
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SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENT
The Idaho Supreme Court's Holding In Murphy Provides An Additional Basis For
Affirming The District Court's Order Denying Parvin's Successive Petition

A

Introduction
Below, Parvin, citing to Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 596, 635 P.2d 955,

960 (1981 ), requested leave to file a successive petition for post-conviction relief,
arguing that his "claims were dismissed due to the ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel."

(38295 R., p.24.)

Consistent with Palmer, the district court

permitted Parvin's successive petition because he was deprived of the effective
assistance of post-conviction counsel. (Id., p.156.) Palmer was overturned in the Idaho
Supreme Court's recent opinion in Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, _ , 327 P.3d 365,
367 (2014), which held "that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is not a
sufficient reason under I.C. § 19-4908 for allowing a successive petition."

Parvin,

therefore, was not entitled to bring a successive petition in this case, and that is an
additional basis on which this Court can affirm the district court's ultimate denial of
Parvin's successive petition.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one of

deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free review of
whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State
v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Smith, 135
Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001 ).
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C.

Parvin Was Not Entitled To A Successive Petition Based On The Ineffective
Assistance Of Counsel In His Original Post-Conviction Proceeding
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction

Procedure Act. I.C. § 19-4901, et seq. Idaho Code§ 19-4908 states:
All grounds for relief available to an applicant under this act must
be raised in his original, supplemental or amended application. Any
ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or
sentence or in any other proceeding the applicant has taken to secure
relief may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless the court
finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not
asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or
amended application.
Under the Idaho Supreme Court's prior precedent in Palmer, an allegation of ineffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel which resulted in claims of trial error being waived
or inadequately raised could provide sufficient reason to file a successive petition.
Palmer, 102 Idaho at 596, 635 P.2d at 960.

The Court specifically overruled that

precedent in Murphy. Murphy, 156 Idaho at_, 327 P.3d at 371.
The Court in Murphy explained that, after Palmer, the United States Supreme
Court clarified in Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), that there was no Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings. Murphy, 156 Idaho at
_ , 327 P.3d at 370.

The Court further noted that "[w]here states have allowed

ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel claims it is generally where a state
statute expressly mandates appointment of post-conviction counsel."

kl

(citations

omitted). But the appointment of counsel in post-conviction proceedings is discretionary
under Idaho law.

kl

at_, 327 P.3d at 371 (citations omitted); see also I.C. § 19-

4904. Therefore, there is no right to post-conviction counsel and, "[w]here there is no
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right to counsel, there can be no deprivation of effective assistance of counsel."

kt

Because there is no right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, whether
constitutional or statutory, a petitioner cannot demonstrate "sufficient reason" for filing a
successive petition based on ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel.

kt

The district court found that Parvin's post-conviction action was dismissed as a
result of Parvin's counsel's ineffective inaction. (38295 R., pp.155-56.) Based on that
finding, and consistent with the overruled precedent, the district court allowed Parvin's
successive petition. (Id., p.156.) But ineffectiveness of counsel did not entitle Parvin to
a successive petition for post-conviction relief. Murphy, 156 Idaho at_, 327 P.3d at
371. Because Parvin was not entitled to a successive petition for post-conviction relief,
the district court could not err by ultimately denying that petition.
On appeal, Parvin argues that his case is distinguishable from Murphy and that
he was entitled to relief consistent with the Idaho Supreme Court's precedent in Eby v.
State, 148 Idaho 731, 228 P.3d 998 (2010). (Appellant's supp. brief, pp.4-6.) Like this
case, the district court in Eby dismissed the post-conviction petition for inactivity after
Eby's appointed attorneys failed to file an amended petition or otherwise do any work on
his case for more than two years.

kt

at 732-33, 228 P.3d at 999-1000.

Unlike this

case, after learning that the petition had been dismissed, Eby, through counsel, sought
relief from the order of dismissal pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).

kt at

733-34, 228 P.3d at 1000-01. The Court, "recognize[ing] and reiterat[ing]" that "there is
no right to effective assistance of counsel in post-conviction cases," still concluded that
Eby's "case may present the 'unique and compelling circumstances' in which I.R.C.P.
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60(b)(6) relief may well be warranted," due to his counsels' utter lack of representation.
~

at 737, 228 P.3d at 1004 (citations omitted).
That a petitioner may be entitled to Rule 60(b )(6) relief where post-conviction

counsel fails to provide representation does not mean that the absence of meaningful
representation presents sufficient reason under Idaho Code § 19-4908 for reasserting
waived claims in a successive petition. Rather, Eby demonstrates that there is already
a remedy for a lack of representation from post-conviction counsel: A Rule 60(b) motion
filed in the initial proceedings-not a successive petition.

By its very terms, the Eby

decision is "limited in scope" and applies only to requests for Rule 60(b) relief in postconviction cases. Eby, 148 Idaho at 736, 228 P.3d at 1003. Moreover, Eby holds that
where a district court appoints post-conviction counsel but counsel does nothing,
resulting in the dismissal of the petition for inactivity, Rule 60(b)(6) confers upon the
court the discretion, in the original post-conviction case, to determine whether appointed
counsel's shortcomings constitute a unique and compelling circumstance warranting
relief from the order of dismissal. Eby, 148 Idaho at 734-38, 228 P.3d at 1001-05. It
does not provide for a successive petition.
Perhaps recognizing this, Parvin asks this Court to salvage his successive
petition for post-conviction relief by construing it as a motion under Rule 60(b)(6).
(Appellant's supp. brief, p.6.) Generally, the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure apply to
petitions for post-conviction relief. Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 202 P.3d 642,
646 (2008). Rule 60(b) allows the court, "[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just"
to "relieve a party ... from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for" mistake, newly
discovered evidence, fraud, etc., and "any other reason justifying relief from the
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operation of the judgment." Rule 60(b), however, also has a timeliness component,
which requires that "[t]he motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for
reasons (1 ), (2), and (3) not more than six (6) months after the judgment, order, or
proceeding was entered or taken."
Even if this Court were to construe PaNin's successive petition as a Rule
60(b)(6) motion, it would be untimely because it was not filed within a reasonable time
of the judgment. The judgment dismissing Parvin's post-conviction petition was filed on
February 26, 2007. (38295 R., p.155.) Below, PaNin claimed that his post-conviction
counsel failed to inform him that his original petition was being dismissed. (Id., pp.7, 2324.) Assuming the truth of this uncontradicted claim, PaNin still knew that his petition
had been summarily dismissed sometime before he filed his untimely appeal of that
dismissal on May 22, 2008. (Id., p.147.) But Parvin did not file a successive petition for
post-conviction relief based on his prior post-conviction counsel's ineffective assistance
until September 16, 2008.

(Id., p.5)

Even allowing that Parvin's initial lack of

knowledge may extend what could be considered a reasonable time for filing a Rule
60(b)(6) motion from the judgment, he did not file within a "reasonable time."

The

motion would therefore have been untimely.
Parvin asserts that the Idaho Supreme Court's holdings in Eby and Murphy are
entirely consistent (Appellant's brief, p.5), and the state agrees. Where post-conviction
counsel's ineffective assistance results in the waiver of claims, that is not a sufficient
reason to allow a successive petition for post-conviction relief, Murphy, but it may
provide a Rule 60(b) remedy in the original petition, Eby. This appeal arises from a
successive petition based on post-conviction counsel's ineffective assistance, not a
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Rule 60(b) motion filed in the original petition, and is therefore precluded under Murphy.
Moreover, Parvin's successive petition for post-conviction relief was not filed within a
reasonable time of the judgment, or even of the time in which Parvin certainly became
aware of the judgment. Even construed as a Rule 60(b)(6) motion, therefore, it would
be untimely and still precluded.
The successive petition bar of Idaho Code § 19-4908 expresses a preference for
the finality of judgments. If a post-conviction petitioner believes appointed counsel has
failed to provide any meaningful representation, under Eby, the time to challenge
counsel's performance is in the original post-conviction action. Murphy makes clear that
such claims may not be raised in a successive post-conviction petition; otherwise,
"claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in the immediate prior proceeding may be
raised ad infinitum." Murphy, 156 Idaho at _ , 327 P.3d at 370 (quotation omitted).
Because ineffective assistance of counsel is not a "sufficient reason" for overcoming the
successive petition bar of Idaho Code § 19-4908, and because ineffective assistance of
counsel was the only reason for granting Parvin a successive petition, the Court's
holding in Murphy provides an additional basis for affirming the district court's ultimate
denial of Parvin's successive petition.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's denial of
Parvin's successive petition for post-conviction relief.

DATED this 1st day of October, 2014.

·R
~
C
~
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 1st day of October, 2014, served a true and
correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy addressed
to:
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

~~

Deputy Attorney General

RJS/pm
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